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INTRODUCTION
The past four years saw an upsurge in abortion restriction
regulation.1 As of November 1, 2012, the Guttmacher Institute
reports twenty states with laws specifically aimed at restricting
women’s abortion rights.2 Louisiana and Utah have an abortion ban
under permanent enjoinment by court order.3 A tension between
state powers of regulation and the autonomy of the human person
1. Chip Reid, Since 2010, 32 States Have Restricted Abortions, CBS NEWS (Aug. 26,
2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/since-2010-32-states-have-restricted-abortions/ (“In
the first six months of 2012, 15 states passed 39 restrictions on abortion. Last year, 24
states passed 92 restrictions, an all-time record.”).
2. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: ABORTION POLICY IN THE ABSENCE
OF ROE (2012) [hereinafter STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF], available at http://www.guttmacher
.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_APAR.pdf. In the event that Roe v. Wade is overturned,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, and South Dakota would criminalize abortion ex-
cept to protect the life of the woman. Thirteen states have abortion bans on state law that
predate Roe v. Wade, although the laws are largely unenforced. Besides the life-protection
exception, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, and New Mexico include an exception for the
health of the woman, of which only Alabama does not include “mental health.” Colorado,
Delaware, Mississippi, and New Mexico contain an exception for rape, and all but New
Mexico extend an exception for incest. The Guttmacher Institute identified seven states
with “laws that express their intent to restrict the right to legal abortion to the maximum
extent permitted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the absence of Roe.” (Arkansas, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Dakota, and Ohio). See id.
3. Id.
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underlies these laws. The commonly accepted state interest that al-
lows the state to infringe on the mother’s rights is “protecting poten-
tial life.” 4 The Supreme Court accepted “safeguarding health” and
“maintaining medical standards” as additional state interests, but
legislation’s focus on protecting the life of the fetus over the mother’s
health strongly indicates where the states’ concerns lie.5
Recently, states have begun to push for a legal redefinition of
“person” to include “unborn children,” arguably as part of the anti-
abortion legislative wave.6 Traditionally, resistance to fetal person-
hood stemmed from the concern that the fetus’s rights would eclipse
the mother’s fundamental rights.7 Critics of the 2010 to 2012 fetal
personhood bills include an argument beyond the usual Fourteenth
Amendment objections, identifying the bills as part of the “War on
Women.” 8 This argument highlights the growing trend in legislation
regarding the larger social conception of the role of women, essen-
tially codifying patriarchal mentality and establishing a woman’s
body as belonging to almost everyone except herself.9 Extreme posi-
tions exist on both sides of the debate, but abortion laws that do not
grant an exception for the mother’s health—let alone the complete
bans—invite analysis into state motivation.10 While the compelling
state interest might be protecting life, a state’s concentration on
controlling women’s bodies instead of improving children’s welfare
services should foster skepticism about whether the real interest is
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
5. Id. at 155; see also STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 2.
6. Monthly State Update: Major Developments in 2012, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 1,
2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2012/nov.html. Oklahoma and
Virginia defeated attempts to redefine “person” to legally include “unborn children,” largely
because of concerns that the redefinitions were attempts to facilitate abortion bans. In
Oklahoma, the attempt included redefining the public health code and the constitution.
In Virginia, the bill attempted to extend a legal redefinition broadly. Id.
7. Jean Reith Schroedel et al., Women’s Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal
Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 99 (2000) (arguing that “[f]etal rights erode
women’s fundamental rights to: due process, privacy, bodily integrity, self sovereignty,
and equal protection).
8. See, e.g., WAR ON WOMEN, http://uswaronwomen.wordpress.com/ (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014); The GOP Takes Its War on Women to the States, PEOPLE FOR THE AM.
WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/gop-takes-its-war-women-states (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
9. Id.
10. STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, supra note 2; see also Mary C. Curtis, Irish Abortion
Debate After Woman’s Death Resonates in U.S., WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2012/11/16/irish-abortion-debate-after
-womans-death-resonates-in-u-s/ (exploring the concern and fear surrounding the Irish
abortion law requiring “real and substantial risk” to life, not health, that has ostensible
roots in Christianity, and a victim’s mother’s poignant demand: “In an attempt to save a
4-month-old fetus they killed my 30-year-old daughter. How is that fair, you tell me?”).
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the preservation of life, the control of women, or even reelection by
way of hot-button issues.
Some states, however, have taken additional steps that reinforce
the legitimacy of the compelling state interest with the laws chosen for
fetal personhood redefinition: South Dakota and Wisconsin amended
their child abuse statutes to identify “child abuse” as including harm
caused to an unborn child.11 If a state has removed the traditional
argument against making fetal abuse a form of child abuse,12 and the
anti-abortion laws are passed in defense of the fetus’s life, the next
step these states should take is to redefine their laws to make abuse
of a pregnant woman an additional crime of child abuse.
This Note does not analyze the new “anti-abortion” laws; instead,
it considers the impact of the alleged state interest behind the laws
and whether the interest is legitimate. Because the anti-abortion
laws are passed in defense of the fetus’s life to the extent that states
are trying to give the fetus the protection of the full force of the law,
this Note explores whether the next step these states should take is to
redefine their laws to make abuse of a pregnant woman an additional
crime of child abuse. This Note will argue that a redefinition of child
abuse will have a greater negative impact on the victim of domestic
violence than a positive impact on preventing the violence. In the
cases where states have already made the change, the Note analyzes
the constitutionality of a redefined child abuse law. It determines
that the law would negatively affect parental rights, including the
abusive partner’s automatic or presumptive paternal legal rights and
the impact on the victim’s parental rights. The Note concludes that
the benefits of redefining abuse of a pregnant woman as child abuse
instead of fetal abuse do not outweigh the harmful consequences.
I. WOMEN, PREGNANCY, AND ABUSE IN THE LAW
A. Domestic Violence During Pregnancy
Domestic violence is a broad category that includes child mal-
treatment, elder maltreatment, and intimate partner violence.13 An
individual is a victim of intimate partner violence when he or she
suffers from “physical, sexual, or psychological harm by a current or
11. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (West 2012) (amended 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981L
(West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-1 (2012) (law valid through 2012).
12. That the law would affect the mother’s right to abortion, or endanger the definition
of personhood.
13. Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence
.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
688 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:685
former partner or spouse.”14 Intimate partner violence is frequent and
serious enough that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
identified it as a public health problem.15 The National Institute of
Justice estimates that, in the United States, approximately 1.5 mil-
lion women experience intimate partner violence annually.16 Debate
continues about how exactly to define intimate partner violence, but
three classifications generally hold: rape, physical assault, and stalk-
ing.17 This Note focuses on physical assault, specifically against preg-
nant women.18
Statistics on abused pregnant women vary.19 In a 1996 survey
of studies, the Journal of the American Medical Association esti-
mated that between 3.9 percent and 8.3 percent of pregnant women
faced abuse, which translates to between 156,000 and 332,000
women.20 A clear number cannot be determined, likely because of
under-reporting.21 Two issues of concern arise: the phenomena of
intensified violence during pregnancy, and the target area of the
violence.22 Although little scholarship on the subject exists, evidence
suggests that for many women in abusive relationships the violence
actually escalates during pregnancy.23 The abuse does more than
intensify, however, as studies suggest that the abuser changes his
14. Violence Prevention: Intimate Partner Violence, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html.
15. Id.
16. Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate
Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey iii (July
2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf. Women are not the
only victims of intimate partner violence. Although women are more likely to experience
violence than men, the National Violence Against Women Survey estimates that 834,732
men suffer intimate partner violence annually. Id.
17. Id. at 5.
18. While this Note primarily addresses the redefinition of fetal abuse in the context
of intimate partner violence against pregnant women, the general analysis can also apply
to violence against pregnant women not perpetrated by an intimate partner. A stranger
who batters a pregnant woman, however, would not be impacted by the discussion on pa-
rental rights.
19. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND.
L.J. 667, 670 (2006).
20. Julie A. Gazmararian et al., Prevalence of Violence Against Pregnant Women, 275
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1915, 1918–19 (1996).
21. Id.; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 670 n.11 (stating that the variances in
the data concerning the prevalence of pregnancy violence may be a result of women under-
reporting their abuse as well as due to the varying methods of collecting the data (citing
Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Abuse During Pregnancy: Progress, Policy, and Potential, 88 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 185–87 (1998))).
22. JAMES DWYER, FAMILY LAW 300 (2012); Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 672.
23. DWYER, supra note 22, at 300; see also Constance MacIntosh, Conceiving Fetal
Abuse, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 178, 189 (1998) (“American research has indicated that pregnant
women are more likely than non-pregnant women to be battered, and that the battering
is usually more intense.”).
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target and the violent acts focus on the abdominal region instead of
the face.24 The mother is not the only direct victim of the battery;
the fetus will often suffer damage, including fractures, low birth
weight, and death.25
Additional factors escalate the danger to the fetus.26 Research
demonstrates that pregnant women’s abusive partners will often
prevent their victims from seeking medical treatment.27 The strong
correlation between abuse victims and drug abuse continues into
pregnancy.28 Women in abusive relationships are at high risk for
what could be seen as “self-medicating” drug abuse.29 One way to
escape the pain and constant fear is to turn to drug or alcohol use,
and if the violence escalates during pregnancy, so too will the pain
and fear.30 Intimate partner violence during pregnancy exposes the
fetus to danger from the external physical abuse as well as the inter-
nalized drugs.31
B. The State of the Law
When a fetus suffers harm, liability falls on the perpetrator under
the charge of fetal abuse, not child abuse.32 Tort law illustrates the
24. MacIntosh, supra note 23, at 189 (“Both Canadian and American research confirm
that when pregnant women are battered, the violence is directed against the part of the
woman’s body which most vividly represents her pregnancy. While violence against non-
pregnant women usually consists of strikes to the face and breasts, violence against preg-
nant women is most often kicks and blows to the abdominal region.”).
25. Id.; see Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 672 (identifying fetal harm from external
physical abuse as “including miscarriage, stillborn birth, preterm labor and delivery, direct
fetal injury, fetal hemorrhage, and placental abruption”).
26. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 672–73 (“[V]iolence during pregnancy has been
associated with maternal substance abuse, smoking, unhealthy diet, low weight gain, de-
layed entry into prenatal care, and low birth weight.”); see also MacIntosh, supra note
23, at 189–90 (“Battered pregnant women are twice as likely to miscarry as non-battered
pregnant women. As well as causing miscarriage, blows to a pregnant woman’s abdomen
is known to directly affect pregnancy by causing abruptio placentae, fetal loss, premature
labour, fetal fractures, low birth weight, and premature delivery, while the woman may
suffer rupture of the uterus, liver, or spleen, pelvic fractures, antepartum hemorrhage
uterine contractions and premature rupture of the membranes.”).
27. MacIntosh, supra note 23, at 190.
28. Id. at 193–94 (“Stewart and Cecutti found extremely different rates of substance
abuse between abused pregnant women and pregnant women who were not abused. Spe-
cifically, they found that only 1.2 [percent] of the Ontarian women whose pregnancies were
not marked with abuse used illicit drugs, while 55.6 [percent] of the abused women used
illicit drugs during their pregnancy. Alcohol use exhibited a similar trend, where just under
20 [percent] of non-abused women drank regularly while pregnant, compared with just
under 70 [percent] of abused women. Both American and Canadian medical researchers
have explicitly acknowledged a causal link between abuse while pregnant and subsequent
substance abuse during pregnancy.”).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1979).
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difficulty associated with a charge of fetal abuse: conceptualizing the
unborn child’s rights without personhood together with the impact
the violence will have made on a legal person in the definitive and
near future.33 The Restatement (Second) of Torts recommends con-
ditioning liability for harm on the child’s state at birth.34 If the child
is alive, the tortfeasor is liable for harm; if the child is not, liability de-
pends on the state’s wrongful death statute.35 In the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act, federal law provides another possible approach to
handling this distinction between the unborn child’s rights and the
future person’s future rights.36 The law treats injury to or uninten-
tional death of the fetus the same as if it was the injury or death of
the mother, but intentional death receives treatment as the death
of a separate human being.37
This delicate handling reflects a heightened awareness of the
conflict between the unborn child’s constitutional rights and the
mother’s constitutional rights, and it is one that states and even pro-
life groups often avoid or ignore.38 Criminal law generally side-steps
the issue of abuse and penalizes violence under fetal homicide laws.39
Despite the constitutional issues surrounding the definition of a fetus
as a “person,” many states acknowledge a viable fetus as a person
under homicide statutes.40 Additional state approaches include crim-
inalizing the harm to the mother if the result is fetal death and aggra-
vated sentences for killing or injuring a pregnant woman.41
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (“One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to
the child for the harm if the child is born alive. If the child is not born alive, there is no
liability unless the applicable wrongful death statute so provides.”).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
37. Id. (“[T]he punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment
provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the un-
born child’s mother . . . . If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills
or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall [be punished] . . . for intentionally
killing or attempting to kill a human being.”).
38. Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 99, 111.
39. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 686.
40. 41 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 1 (1985) (citing Commonwealth. v. Cass, 392 Mass.
799, 808, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (Mass. 1984); Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005)). See State v. Lamy, 158 N.H. 511, 519, 969 A.2d 451, 459 (N.H. 2009) (uphold-
ing the “born alive” rule); see also State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628–30 (Minn. 1985)
(holding that a fetus is not a person under the vehicular homicide statute, but superseded
by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2662 (West 2013) that criminalize homicide of an unborn child).
41. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 696 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (1995); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (West 1994) as state laws crim-
inalizing injury to the mother leading to fetal death and citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53A-59A
(2001 & SUPP. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 612 (2001 & SUPP. 2004); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-31, 32.1 (2004); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-502 (2005) as state laws without the fetal
death element).
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In state law, only South Dakota and Wisconsin treat harm
caused to an unborn child as actual child abuse.42 Some states, spe-
cifically Ohio and Pennsylvania, step beyond civil charges for an
unborn child’s death and have revised murder laws that include un-
born children.43 Ohio categorizes purposeful death of an unborn child
as aggravated murder.44 Pennsylvania’s protection arguably extends
beyond the typical locality of an unborn child in the mother’s womb
to include eggs fertilized in a petri dish by defining an “unborn child”
and “fetus” as “an individual organism of the species homo sapiens
from fertilization until live birth.” 45 But while one could hope that the
two extremes—avoidance and absolute coverage—might balance out
in general state policy, critics warn that these laws are not designed
to protect the unborn child from physical abuse against the mother.46
C. Prosecuting Mothers
Many laws that address fetal abuse focus on the mother’s use
of drugs and give a passing mention—if any—to external violence.47
Common treatment of fetal abuse mirrors Whitner v. State, in which
South Carolina established maternal drug use as grounds for child
abuse prosecution.48 South Dakota, which recently amended its child
abuse statutes to include unborn children, also allows for the invol-
untary commitment of pregnant women who drink or do drugs.49
Wisconsin, the only other state that identifies fetal abuse as child
abuse, also allows for such control of pregnant women.50 An amend-
ment to the Wisconsin definition of “abuse” and “physical injury”
under the Children’s Code declares,
When used in referring to an unborn child, serious physical harm
inflicted on the unborn child, and the risk of serious physical
42. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (West 2012) (amended 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981L
(West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-1 (2012).
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01, 2903.09 (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2601–09 (2013).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A).
45. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West 2012); see Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at
n.162 (“The sponsor of the Pennsylvania bill was asked in legislative debates if someone
who entered a medical clinic and knocked over a petri dish containing fertilized eggs, could
be charged with multiple homicide. The sponsor said, ‘If you knew, and it was your intent,
then yes.’ ”).
46. See Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 94, 106, 111.
47. Id. at 105–06, 111.
48. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145
(1998); Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 102.
49. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-70(3) (2012) (law valid through 2012); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-8A-2(9) (2012) (“Who was subject to prenatal exposure to abusive use of alco-
hol, marijuana, or any controlled drug or substance not lawfully prescribed by a practi-
tioner . . . .”); Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at n.127.
50. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2012).
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harm to the child when born, caused by the habitual lack of self-
control of the expectant mother of the unborn child in the use of
alcohol beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance
analogs, exhibited to a severe degree.51
In a case in Wyoming, a woman filed a domestic violence com-
plaint, but she was arrested herself for child abuse in the form of
drinking alcohol while pregnant, despite the legality of her actions.52
The danger of this focus on prosecuting the mother appears most
clearly when there is more attention on mothers endangering their
unborn children rather than when a third party threatens them both.
The logic is not difficult. In the first instance, a mother endangers
herself when she uses drugs, but the unborn child can be seen as the
true victim because the mother made the choice. In the second in-
stance, neither the mother nor the unborn child chose the violence.
The mother is most likely the intended victim; in the abuser’s mind,
harm to the unborn child is incidental.53 There are two victims.
A closer analysis, however, shows that the first case will very
often contain two true victims. Given the connection between drug
abuse and physical abuse, the pregnant woman who uses drugs may
very likely be a victim herself, and prosecuting her for child abuse
while ignoring the external threat does not remedy the situation or
protect the unborn child. The basis for this failure of our legal sys-
tem is unclear. It might be the same bias that impacts regular child
abuse cases in which a mother arguably is held to a higher duty of
care than the abuser, or it could be a cultural blindness to the fact
that there are individuals who would attack a pregnant woman.54 As
fetal abuse laws stand today, pregnant women faced with physical
abuse may feel—and might be correct—that little protection exists
for them.
II. MAKING THE CHANGE FROM FETAL ABUSE TO CHILD ABUSE
The predominant fear behind further legislative acts criminal-
izing harm to a fetus concerns the impact on the mother.55 In the
wake of the anti-abortion laws from the past two years, women’s
51. Id. § 48.02.
52. Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at n.163 (citing Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Women
for Their Behavior During Pregnancy: An Approach that Undermines the Health of Women
and Children, DRUG ADDICTION RES. & THE HEALTH OF WOMEN (NIDA) 1998, at 468).
53. MacIntosh, supra note 23, at 189.
54. Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 94; see also Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Peretz,
A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation: The Case of Fetal Abuse, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 335, 349 (1994).
55. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 696.
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rights supporters are on edge that women are being relegated back
to the role of child-making machine instead of equal person.56 An
inclusion of unborn children under child abuse statutes might fur-
ther “an agenda of control over women’s bodies and lives.” 57
A. Eclipsing a Victim
Typically, a woman’s right to control her body in abortion cases
carries the implication that she has the right to control whether  she
carries the fetus within her.58 But the right to control one’s body ex-
tends beyond what occurs within it; the right is not only about what
the woman can do, but what others can do to the woman.59 This in-
cludes the most basic tort of battery. A woman’s—or any person’s—
right to control her body preserves her right to be free from harm by
third parties. Concern over women’s rights, therefore, is not limited
to abortion, but her very right to live in safety. Redefining fetal
abuse as child abuse carries the possibility of a dangerous conse-
quence. The mother’s own victim status may be eclipsed by the un-
born child’s victimization once their interests are severed into two
distinct categories.60 The legal system’s focus on the harm to the
unborn child “effectively precludes an account of the nature of [the
pregnant woman’s] suffering, or even recognition of her existence as
a person who has been harmed. The suffering of pregnant victims of
domestic violence is thus rendered invisible, leaving real injuries to
women unremedied.” 61
There is the possibility that a severance of interests could be in
the pregnant woman’s interest. Every state has taken on the burden
of child protection, including investigating and prosecuting child
abusers.62 Not every state, however, criminally prosecutes domestic
violence. In Virginia, for example, the victim may request a protective
order, but this is a civil matter and is the victim’s responsibility to ac-
quire.63 Charges for assault and battery can be prosecuted, but this
56. These concerns are certainly not unfounded, given the rhetoric surrounding the
bills and laws. See Adam Peck, Georgia Republican Compares Women to Cows, Pigs, and
Chickens, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2012
/03/12/442637/georgia-rep-compares-women-to-animals/?mobile=nc.
57. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 696.
58. Id. at 700–03.
59. Id. at 696–97.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. DWYER, supra note 22, at 445, 641.
63. An emergency protective order can be requested by the responding police officer.
If the abuser violates the protective order, the state may prosecute. VA DEP’T OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., AN INFORMATIONAL GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS IN VIRGINIA:
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also depends on the victim’s willingness or ability to speak against
her attacker.64 If abuse of an unborn child became child abuse, the
state’s child protective services would take over the investigation, and
as the unborn child still resides within the pregnant woman, she
would also receive the benefit of the abuser’s removal.65
1. Punishing the Victim
Child abuse proceedings might bring the pregnant victim relief
from violence, but it could be a double-edged sword if proceedings
are brought against the victim for exposing the child to domestic
violence.66 Most states decide not to prosecute the domestic violence
victims for failing to remove her child from the situation, but in states
that are willing to deny women the right to control their own bodies,
even in instances of rape, the legislature and the courts might hold
pregnant victims to an even higher duty of care, since they ostensi-
bly control what happens to the unborn child within them.67 Some
states do suggest that a child’s exposure to domestic violence can be
treated as failure to protect the child, or neglect, although Florida
is the only state that specifically allows the victim to be charged with
neglect.68 If states focused on the harm to the unborn child, and placed
that harm above the victim’s own suffering, the benefits derived from
the switch would disappear, and the pregnant victim would return
to a state of punishment from which the legal system has sought to
release abused mothers.69
Child witnesses to domestic violence are different than children
in direct physical harm, however. The responsibility to protect a child
from an abusive situation is legislated mainly regarding sexual abuse.
Many states authorize termination of parental rights if the parent
has actual knowledge that a third party sexually abused the child
UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL PROCESS FOR VICTIMS OF FAMILY ABUSE 2 (2010), available
at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/victims/documents/domviobr.pdf.
64. Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, Domestic and Sexual Violence
in Virginia: 2008 Annual Report 4 (2008), available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/Pro
grams%20and%20Resources/Domestic%20Violence/08_AttyGeneral_AnnualReport.pdf.
65. DWYER, supra note 22, at 486–87.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(44) (West 2012). Section 1012 of the New York Family
Court Act  enables neglect charges against the victim, but under a heightened standard
with attention given to the domestic violence victim’s circumstances. See Nicholson v.
Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 371 (2004) (holding that “[w]hether a particular mother in these
circumstances has actually failed to exercise a minimum degree of care is necessarily de-
pendent on facts such as the severity and frequency of the violence, and the resources and
options available to her”).
69. DWYER, supra note 22, at 444–45.
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and the parent did not act to protect the child.70 Termination can
also occur when the parent “refused to accept that the abuse was
occurring.” 71 In some states, the law puts an arguably undue burden
of responsibility on mothers when they fail to remove the child from
an abusive situation in which the child is the direct physical victim.72
The child’s physical exposure to the domestic violence, as opposed to
merely witnessing it, could increase the chances that the pregnant
victim would be charged with failure to protect.
2. Punishing Minorities and the Poor
Criminalizing harm to a pregnant woman as child abuse brings
another concern already well-established in the field of child abuse
law: the disparate impact neglect charges have on minorities and
poor women.73 “Poor, non-white women” are “easy targets” of fetal
protection statutes.74 These classes of women cannot afford the level
of care the unborn child might require to pass a neglect statute’s
standard.75 They are less likely to have access to or be able to afford
prenatal care, such as vitamins.76 And if a complication arises during
pregnancy that requires bed rest, the woman may have to choose be-
tween working to keep the required level of income to support a child
and her own care, or resting to preserve the unborn child’s health.77
The current child abuse statutes that include unborn children
contain a high risk for disparate impact, since their focus seems to
be on punishing pregnant mothers who abuse drugs.78 Minority and
poor women are more likely to use public hospitals, where testing
for drug use is more common.79 In a 1990 report, the American Civil
Liberties Union reported that “more than half of all arrests for pre-
natal exposure to harmful narcotics occurred in South Carolina,
70. 53 A.L.R. 5th 499, § 3 (1997) (citing multiple cases in which the parent whose pa-
rental rights the court terminates for failure to protect is the mother).
71. States will also terminate parental rights if the parent should have known about
the abuse. Because the pregnant woman would actually be aware of the abuse against her-
self, and would either fail to act to protect the child or would refuse to accept that she was
being abused, these two categories of “failure to protect” are most applicable. 53 A.L.R.
5th 499, § 4, 5 (1997).
72. Id.
73. Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 110 n.154.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 110.
79. Id.; Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 691 n.129 (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Creating
and Solving the Problem of Drug Use During Pregnancy, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1353, 1364 (2000)).
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where all the women arrested were poor and a majority were African-
American.” 80 These disproportionate numbers are affected by per-
sonal biases emerging from stereotypes, such as medical staff more
likely to test a black pregnant woman for drug use than a white preg-
nant woman.81
An additional factor that cannot be forgotten is the already dis-
parate numbers of minority women who suffer from domestic violence
compared to white women.82 This increases a minority pregnant
woman’s chances of being a substance abuser, because of the corre-
lation between drug abuse and intimate partner violence.83 To critics
who argue that drug users continue to abuse drugs in disregard of
their unborn child’s welfare, studies respond that resources are slim
for the women who would seek help with substance abuse problems.84
The American Civil Liberties Union reported a 1989 survey in New
York City that found “[fifty-four percent of drug treatment facilities]
refuse to accept pregnant women, [sixty-seven percent] refuse to ac-
cept pregnant women on Medicaid, and [eighty-seven percent] refuse
to accept pregnant crack users on Medicaid.” 85 If a change from fetal
abuse to child abuse laws did occur, the states with a compelling in-
terest in protecting human life should consider that human life con-
tinues past birth, and work to help victims recover, not punish them.
B. Beneficial Extensions?
Extending violence against a pregnant woman to include a charge
of child abuse could directly and negatively impact the mother, sac-
rificing her for the child’s welfare, but a combination of child protec-
tion law and domestic violence law could also catalyze a change in
judicial approaches to intimate partner abuse. The high recidivism of
domestic abusers—which does not account for unreported cases—
indicates that prosecution is far from a complete solution. The com-
mingling of laws might shift judicial and legislative focus toward
rehabilitation, similar to the focus in child protection law and drug
80. Schroedel et al., supra note 7, at 110.
81. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 691 n.129 (“A study of pregnant women in Pinellas
County, Florida, found that despite similar rates of substance abuse, Black women were
ten times more likely than whites to be reported to government authorities.”).
82. Id. at 691.
83. MacIntosh, supra note 23, at 194–95.
84. Renee I. Solomon, Future Fear: Prenatal Duties Imposed by Private Parties, 17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 411, 417–18 (1991).
85. Id. (citing Memorandum from A.C.L.U. Found. Reproductive Freedom Project and
Women’s Rights Project to A.C.L.U. Affiliates, Discriminatory Punishment of Pregnant
Women 5 (Feb. 15, 1990)).
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offender law. In cases where prosecution occurs against the preg-
nant woman, specifically in cases that would fall under the identifi-
cation of battered woman syndrome, the additional defense that she
was protecting her child’s life could gain greater traction if the law
recognizes the unborn child as a person when exposed to danger.
1. Interrelating Drug Law, Domestic Violence, and Child
Protection Services
The impact of a change to child abuse would depend on the at-
titude of the jurisdiction toward domestic violence, similar to the
importance of a jurisdiction’s attitude toward drug offenders.86 There
are distinct similarities between drug offenders and domestic abusers.
Domestic abusers are often drug users.87 Both offenses often originate
from a sense that the offender lacks control over his life, and there
is a correlation with unemployment rates.88 Both have high recidi-
vism rates, and offenders in both categories often commit additional
crimes.89 Public perception of the two offenses differs on the question
of government interference, but these perceptions are firmly rooted
in morality. Drug regulation in the United States increased in the
twentieth century War on Drugs, but the public’s willingness for
government restriction appeared before this, most notably during
the Prohibition Era with an actual amendment to the United States
Constitution.90 Domestic violence, meanwhile, carried an acute aware-
ness that regulation of such a crime involved intrusion into the
private life.91 In a malignant patriarchal approach, violence against
86. See Jeannie Brooks et al., Domestic Violence Courts and Batterer’s Treatment
Programs, in THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 311 (2009).
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 318 (citing L. FEDER & L. DUGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TESTING A COURT-
MANDATED TREATMENT FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS: THE BROWARD EXPERIMENT
(2004), a study of domestic violence treatment programs in which “the number of months
[a participant was] employed was significantly and inversely related to the likelihood of
rearrest.”); SUPREME COURT OF VA, EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA’S DRUG TREATMENT COURT
PROGRAMS (PHASE 1) 18 (2004), available at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/fc86
c2b17a1cf388852570f9006f1299/82c03793ce42b31785256ec500553b91/$FILE/RD40.pdf.
89. A strong factor for recidivism is the lack of rationality behind both offenders’
actions. Drug abusers are driven by their addiction, and domestic abusers are often driven
by emotion and the heat of the moment. Brooks et al., supra note 86, at 314 (explaining
that “[m]any states have recognized that the domestic crimes need to be handled differently
than non-domestic crimes in the court system . . . these crimes are emotionally charged
and involve people who have relationships, which will not necessarily end with the adjudi-
cation of the case”). Drug offenders often are associated with theft, and domestic abusers
often carry charges for assault and battery outside the home as well as arson.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
91. Although drug regulation laws tend to address selling differently from using, this
still stands in contrast to the blanket acceptance of domestic violence which extended so
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women did not always rise to the level of a crime.92 English common
law notoriously permitted the “rule of thumb”: limiting beatings of
a wife or child to wooden instruments no thicker than the husband
or father’s thumb.93 The fact that this law was intended to reduce
violence against women and children highlights the prevalent accep-
tance of domestic violence as a private issue.94
While the contemporary criminal justice system tackles domestic
violence more firmly than the 1980s, and our societal acceptance of
an alleged male prerogative to control his female partner is sharply
diminished, the rhetoric surrounding domestic violence still contains
a reluctant sense of privacy and an unwillingness toward govern-
ment interference.95 This reluctance echoes in child protection law,
as legislatures and courts prefer that child protective services place
a greater emphasis on offering services and attempting rehabilita-
tion than removing children from their homes.96 Despite the privacy
difference between drug offenses and domestic violence, the child
protection focus on providing services matches the current preferred
judicial approach to drug offenders: drug treatment programs.97 Per-
haps a commingling of rehabilitation-based child protection law with
domestic violence law under a redefined pregnancy abuse statute
would have a positive effect and further move the criminal justice
system toward a domestic abuser treatment program.
Beginning in the 1970s, the criminal justice system experimented
with “therapeutic justice” through drug treatment programs designed
and run through drug courts.98 These courts use court monitoring
far as to include marital rape. Margaret A. Rosenbaum, The Prosecution of Domestic
Violence: An Overview, 68 FLA. B.J. 52 (1994); see also Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving
Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without End-
ing the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1492 (2008) (“Police customarily refused
to arrest batterers. Instead, they either let violent incidents take their course or employed
ineffective methods like informal mediation or ordering the offender to ‘walk around the
block and cool off.’ If an arrest did occur, prosecutors typically declined to pursue criminal
charges. When cases came to court, judges routinely denied relief, viewing domestic vio-
lence as a family matter to be worked out by the parties themselves.”).
92. Rosenbaum, supra note 91, at 52.
93. Id. at 52 n.2 (citing Terry Davidson, Wife Beating: A Recurring Phenomenon
Throughout History, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE (1977)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 374 (2004) (acknowledging “the
Legislature’s expressed goal of ‘placing increased emphasis on preventive services de-
signed to maintain family relationships rather than responding to children and families
in trouble only by removing the child from the family’ ”) (citing Mark G. v. Sabol, 93
N.Y.2d 710, 719, 695 N.Y.S.2d 730, 717 N.E.2d 1067 (1999)).
97. Brooks et al., supra note 86, at 311.
98. Id.
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and community probation, along with testing, addiction treatment,
and skill training to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism.99
The courts utilize local and private organizations to ensure as well-
rounded a rehabilitation as possible, provided that participants are
willing.100 The underlying rationale of the courts is the understand-
ing that lowered recidivism translates into lowered numbers of pris-
oners, lowered burdens on police and first responders, less litigation,
and the difficulty to calculate social values that include a safer soci-
ety and safer homes for the offender’s family.101 Since June 2009, the
Hanover, Virginia juvenile drug treatment court saw thirty-two
participants, and at least twenty-two success stories that included
receipt of a GED or high school diploma.102 Drug treatment courts
already recognize the correlation between drug abuse and child abuse.
Family Drug Treatment Courts across the nation accept “addicted
parents charged with child abuse and neglect.”103 With the success
of drug courts, states adopted the “problem-solving court” model to
domestic violence.104
99. EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA’S DRUG TREATMENT COURT PROGRAMS, supra note 88,
at 8–9 (citing the Drug Courts Program Office, United States Department of Justice that
“[d]rug treatment courts are specialized court calendars or dockets specifically designed
to take advantage of the court’s influence over ensuring the positive development in of-
fender behavior. The outcome and goal of this special docket is the reduction in recidivism
and substance abuse among nonviolent, substance abusing offenders by increasing their
likelihood for successful rehabilitation through expedited, continuous, and intense judicially
supervised treatment; mandatory periodic drug testing; and the use of graduated sanctions
and other rehabilitation services”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 10 (“Because of the strong association between drug addiction and crime,
judges have a legitimate interest in dispositions that fit the crime and best protect public
safety. Additionally, courts must look for long-term solutions to crowded dockets largely
caused by repeat drug offenders and limited sanctions such as incarceration that have
proven ineffective in changing an addict’s habits.”).
102. VIRGINIA DRUG COURT ASSOCIATION (2012), available at http://www.vdca.net/drug
-court-spotlight (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). The Virginia Legislature would emphasize that
the success of a treatment program depends on its policies, including termination and
eligibility, but this does not detract from the overall lower recidivism rate for participants.
EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA’S DRUG TREATMENT COURT PROGRAMS, supra note 88, at 112
(“Comparison between dissimilar drug court programs is likened to comparing the achieve-
ments of an academically gifted classroom with the achievements of a mentally disabled
classroom. While both may show significant achievement gains, they do not start at the
same point and therefore cannot be compared. While recidivism is impacted by offender
factors, recidivism is also impacted by program factors such as eligibility criteria and
termination policies. Recidivism rates of smaller drug court programs are impacted by rela-
tively minor variations (i.e., it would take fewer recidivist offenders to affect Staunton’s
recidivism rate and many more recidivist offenders to affect Roanoke’s graduate recidi-
vism rate).”).
103. EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA’S DRUG TREATMENT COURT PROGRAMS, supra note 88,
at 19.
104. Brooks et al., supra note 86, at 311.
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Programs for domestic violence offenders show a wider discrep-
ancy in success than drug treatment programs, but the overarching
conclusion seems to be that men who attended the program frequently
were less likely to be rearrested for domestic violence.105 In one study
of domestic violence offender treatment programs, the partners of
men who attended three-month programs felt safer than those of men
who attended a nine-month program.106 A tentative conclusion to this
data was the impact of a court review as a deterrent: when the re-
view was closer in time to the offense, the deterrent was stronger.107
This reflects a recurring theme in domestic violence literature: the
suspicion that “batterers are not intrinsically motivated to change
their violent behavior, but will do so when external pressures are in
place.”108 The high recidivism rate of domestic abusers strongly in-
dicates that prosecuting an offender will not change his behavior, and
as will be addressed later under the battered woman syndrome, their
victims are unlikely to force an end to the cycle of abuse.109 Given the
similarities between drug offenders and domestic abusers, particu-
larly the cycle each remains in and the recognition that the threat of
prosecution is not enough to readjust their behavior, domestic vio-
lence rehabilitation programs might be a plausible alternative.110
The difficulty becomes incentivizing attendance.111 A 2004 study
by Feder and Dugan concluded that “the men who do not seem to be
deterred from missing their court-mandated treatment, are also not
105. Id. at 318 (citing the Feder and Dugan study of domestic violence treatment pro-
grams for convicted offenders in which “[a]lmost one quarter [(twenty-four percent)] of men
in both conditions [one year probation, or one year probation with attendance of a local
Spouse Abuse Abatement Program] were rearrested within the year, but the men who
attended all classes were significantly less likely to be arrested, while men who attended
fewer classes were 2.5 times more likely than the control group to be arrested”).
106. Id. at 317 (citing the Gondolph 1999 study of four groups: “a pretrial group for a
three month duration with additional service referrals; a three month post-conviction
group . . . with referrals and assessments with women’s groups; and a nine month post-
conviction group that included evaluation and in-house treatment for substance abuse
issues, mental health, and women’s casework”).
107. Id. at 315-17 (“Psychologists know that learning theory tells us that the conse-
quences must immediately follow the act or the intended punishment will not be suc-
cessful in stopping the offending behavior.”).
108. In a Dalton 2001 study, the level of external pressure did not correlate with a
change in behavior. This study involved a program with significant flaws, however, in-
cluding a requirement that the participants pay for the treatment, and failure to address
substance abuse or unemployment which are extreme predictors of domestic violence.
Considering the correlations among unemployment, an inability to afford a program,
drug use, and domestic violence, these absences were most likely fatal to the program’s
success. Brooks et al., supra note 86, at 317.
109. Id.; infra Part II.B.2.
110. EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA’S DRUG TREATMENT COURT PROGRAMS, supra note 88,
at 10.
111. Brooks et al., supra note 86, at 318.
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deterred from the consequences of rearrest.”112 In the drug courts,
judicial oversight attempts to fulfill the reinforcing and incentivizing
factors for participation.113 The Dalton and Feder and Dugan studies
indicate this might not be enough for a domestic violence offender.114
If the offender is guilty of violence against a pregnant woman and
of child abuse, however, child protection services becomes another
powerful vehicle for incentive. Regardless of the majority judicial
and legislative preference for keeping a child with his family, Child
Protective Services carries an implicit threat to many parents that
their child will be taken from them.115 For domestic abusers, who are
usually motivated by desires for control, this is a danger that they
could prevent simply by attending a few months of counseling, and
therefore might be enough to encourage them to actually attend the
program.116 If the program works, the mother and child gain a safer
environment. If the program does not work, Child Protective Services
will be invested in the child’s situation and monitor the danger level,
including violence against the mother. The additional agency protec-
tion for the mother and child supports the change of fetal abuse to
child abuse, but cases will still exist in which the woman does not feel
adequately protected by the legal system and takes her defense into
her own hands.
2. An Extra Shield in Battered Woman Syndrome
Many jurisdictions accept evidence of battered woman syndrome
as a relevant factor for the jury to consider when evaluating a self-
defense claim.117 Battered woman syndrome coincides with the theory
112. Id. at 319.
113. EVALUATION OF VIRGINIA’S DRUG TREATMENT COURT PROGRAMS, supra note 88,
at 10 (explaining that the Office of the Executive Secretary of Virginia believes “[j]udicial
oversight and regular monitoring is invaluable as it ensures offender accountability to
conditions of probation and compliance with treatment. The enhancement provided by the
drug court judge acts as a positive reinforcement from an authority figure and further rein-
forces the offender’s course to recovery. There is simply greater inducement to take drug
treatment seriously when the power and authority of the court is directly involved”).
114. Brooks et al., supra note 86, at 317, 319.
115. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 374 (2004).
116. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, The Evolutionary Social Psychology of Family Vio-
lence, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS,
448–51 (Charles B. Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998) (analyzing the underlying
motivations of intimate partner abuse).
117. State v. Price, 2008 WL 5234351 at *1, *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (“Other jurisdic-
tions have specifically found that expert testimony on battered women’s syndrome is rele-
vant to the issue of a defendant’s claim of self-defense.”) (citing State v. Hickson, 630 So.
2d 172 (Fla. 1993); Pickle v. State, 280 Ga. App. 821, 635 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006);
People v. Evans, 271 Ill. App. 3d 495, 208 Ill. Dec. 42, 648 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995);
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of “learned helplessness,” an explanation that battered women are
rendered almost incapable of acting in self-defense.118
To claim self-defense successfully, one bears the burden of prov-
ing that, when she resorted to violence, “she acted ‘reasonably’ in
light of her perception of imminent and life-threatening danger.”119
Battered woman syndrome offers context for courts struggling to
deal with an issue that while common in our society, our history of
legal response is not well-designed to address.120 Usually, battered
woman syndrome provides evidence toward the woman’s state of
mind.121 It can help courts account for her “perception” of a danger
that, taken out of the context of cyclical abuse, would not be consid-
ered imminent.122 Battered woman syndrome also explains the victim-
turned-defendant’s inability to retreat from what she perceived as a
dangerous situation.123
Controversy still surrounds the use of battered woman syndrome:
how to introduce it, in which prong of the law to use it, how to instruct
juries, and how to overcome social misunderstanding of the battered
woman’s situation.124 Battered woman syndrome is not technically
a defense.125 The defense in a case about a battered woman’s assault
or homicide of her intimate partner is usually insanity, diminished
capacity, heat of passion, or self-defense.126
[E]vidence that the defendant was a battered woman is introduced
to show what bearing such fact had on her mental state at the time
State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d
387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); People v. Wilson, 194 Mich. App.
599, 487 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001); Boykins v. State, 116 Nev. 171, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178,
478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); People v. Seeley, 186 Misc.2d 715, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2000); State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); Bechtel v. State,
840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Miller, 430 Pa. Super. 297, 634 A.2d
614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2006); Fielder v. State, 756
S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).
118. Incapable from a psychological viewpoint. Lenore Walker, The Battered Women
Syndrome Study Overview, in THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 1, 8–9 (2009) (“The theory
of learned helplessness suggests that [battered women] give up the belief that they can
escape from the batterer in order to develop sophisticated coping strategies.”).
119. Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 141, 144 (1995).
120. Id. at 145, 156–57.
121. Id.
122. Id. at n.19.
123. Id. at 169.
124. Id. at 160–61, 176–77.
125. 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 1, § 3 (1983).
126. Id.
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of the alleged crime. In essence, the claim is that, as a result of
repeated beatings administered by the man, the woman finally
reached the breaking point and assaulted or killed the man.127
A negative consequence of using battered woman syndrome in
self-defense claims arises when juries are unable to understand what
caused the woman to break from the cycle of violence.128 If the ex-
pert convinces the jury to accept her “learned helplessness” as why
she was unable to leave the abusive situation, her sudden decision
to use violence seems incongruous.129 A battered woman on trial for
assault and battery, or homicide or murder, seems to be inherently
at odds with the learned helplessness that kept her in the abusive
situation for long enough to reach the stage where she felt her life
was in imminent danger.130
If a statute protecting unborn children changed from fetal abuse
to child abuse, the pregnant battered woman might have a stronger
case for a sense of imminent danger, once the standard for protection
of the child is higher than the standard for the fetus. The introduc-
tion of the legal child as an additional party in danger from the abuse
in a pregnant woman’s case might help juries make the transition
from “learned helplessness” to “fear for her life.” The woman’s defense
could more easily be framed in the “traditional legal notions of jus-
tification or excuse,” which circumvents a dilemma most battered
woman defenses face.131
Substantive criminal law fails to account adequately for homi-
cides committed by women that do not fit the traditional male-
patterned homicide. A woman’s acts might be understandable in
light of mitigating facts, yet may fall outside of substantive
criminal law doctrines such as passion and provocation, self-
defense, insanity, and so-called diminished capacity. She is
forced to engineer a way to present her reality within the con-
fines of a structure that excludes her life experience.132
127. Id.
128. Griffith, supra note 119, at 181.
129. Id.
130. Id. (“In such cases, a victim of domestic violence who is now on trial as a criminal
defendant is confronted with evidence that the violence immediately preceding the homi-
cide was no different than any other episode of violence between the parties. The woman
who has fought back and killed her batterer is challenged to articulate what was unique
or different about the final cycle of abuse that caused her to use deadly force against her
batterer. Often, she is unable to do so, and her self-defense claim is undermined.”).
131. Id. at 157.
132. Id. (quoting Laura E. Reece, Women’s Defenses to Criminal Homicide and the Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 53 (1991)).
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A case in which the woman’s acts can be framed as protecting her
unborn child would fit into the traditional understanding of defense-
motivated violence.
In a self-defense case, the abuse the battered woman suffered
most likely would have to be physical abuse.133 Emotional or psycho-
logical abuse is difficult to quantify.134 Most courts require a physical
showing of harm to a victim.135 If the victim cannot prove physical
harm to herself, she would be unable to gain redress in a suit against
her abuser.136 In a case where she is the defendant, and the majority
of her story rests on emotional or psychological abuse, she would be
unable to meet the burden of proof regarding imminent danger.137
If a statute changed from fetal abuse to child abuse, however, she
might be able to mount a more successful claim given the impact on
the child.138 A case might be made that the abuse negatively affected
the fetus, since the health of the one impacts the health of the other.139
When a pregnant woman suffers extreme stress, the fetus can suffer
physically in response.140
This requires an alignment of the stars: that the battered woman
breaks from her learned helplessness during pregnancy, and that ju-
ries are more willing to accept the timing of this break, especially if
abuse already occurred during the pregnancy. In a state that changed
fetal abuse to child abuse, the jury might be more willing to accept
the explanation that the longer the woman was pregnant, the more
she viewed the fetus as a child in need of protection. This defense,
of course, carries the danger that the pregnant woman would be
charged with neglect for failing to remove the child from the abusive
133. Even though emotional and psychological abuse can be constant and the true basis
for the sense of helplessness. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That
for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 29–30 (2004).
134. Jeffrey R. Baker, The Failure and Promise of Common Law Equity in Domestic
Abuse Cases, 58 LOY. L. REV. 559, 591 (2012).
135. Id. at 593–94.
136. Id. at 595–96.
137. Id. at 590 (explaining that “[v]ictims of emotional abuse have increased chances
of diverse mental health complications, including depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and suicidal ideation. Women exposed to domestic abuse report higher inci-
dents of intrusive thoughts, ruminations and avoidance, and symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder. More intense trauma symptoms occur in those who have survived more
severe violence”).
138. Renee Gardner, Just Relax! Moms’ Stress Is Linked to Baby’s Health, ENVIRON-
MENTAL HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.environmentalhealthnews.org/ehs
/newscience/2011/08/2011-0824-moms-stress-kids-health/.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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situation.141 The positive impacts on a battered woman’s defense must
be weighed against this risk.
Evidence suggests that this risk, or even the need to explain the
break from learned helplessness, might not complicate a pregnant
battered woman’s defense.142 Battered woman syndrome has three
phases.143 The first phase includes “minor” physical abuse.144 The sec-
ond phase is the deadly or life threatening one, in which the intimate
partner “loses control and inflicts a serious beating on his [partner].
A stage two incident may consist of prolonged beating that seriously
injures or even kills the woman.”145 The third stage seems to be the
entrapment stage, in which the batterer “regrets” his behavior and
acting in a caring way, convincing his victim that he has changed.146
This cycle continues as long as the second stage does not kill the
victim, or the victim does not escape.147 Research suggests that the
second stage often occurs during a victim’s advanced stage of preg-
nancy.148 The stars, therefore, have a good chance of aligning in the
battered pregnant woman’s favor.
C. Constitutional Concerns
Although the constitutional issues regarding a woman’s right
to control her body are temporarily set aside for the purposes of this
Note, once a statute chooses to identify a subject as a “child,” parental
constitutional rights immediately come into play.149 The state has the
power to create legal relationships, and provide the protection asso-
ciated with each relationship.150 Our society decided that natural par-
ents are the preferred guardians for a child, and placed the power
of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause behind this custody
right.151 This right can be terminated if the best interests of the child
141. See supra text accompanying notes 45–52.
142. 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 1, § 2, § 3 (1983).
143. Id. § 2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 27.
148. 34 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 1, § 2 (1983) (citing Donald L. Creach, Note,
Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34
STAN. L. REV. 615 n.39 (Feb 1982)).
149. See supra Part I.
150. DWYER, supra note 22, at 11.
151. Id. at 385–88; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; 53 A.L.R. 5th 499, § 2 (1997)
(stating that “[i]n the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly
established than the right of a natural parent to custody of his or her child. It is a
fundamental liberty protected and guaranteed by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution”).
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require it, but “[p]arental rights may not be terminated unless there
are grounds shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
such termination is in the best interest of the child.”152
Changing a fetal abuse statute to a child abuse statute could
create a situation in which parental rights can be terminated before
the child is even born. In some states, domestic violence laws would
need to account for the fetus’s presence in the mother’s womb.153 Even
if the fetus is unharmed by the abuse, a redefinition of “child” in child
abuse law to include a fetus has wide reaching impacts on parental
rights.154 Not only the abuser’s parental rights would be impacted,
however. The mother could face losing custody before her child is even
born, if the concerns addressed above about failure to protect, neglect,
and other abuse come to pass.155
In an attempt to preserve parental constitutional rights, the law
usually requires reasonable alternatives to removal from parents.156
Two possible outcomes appear if a statute changes fetal abuse to child
abuse. The state could continue to emphasize parental rights in a mis-
construction of the child’s best interests, and waste resources, time,
and the child’s well-being trying to fix a situation. Alternatively, the
early intervention could save time, resources, and well-being by pre-
venting the child from entering a directly abusive situation.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a serious issue, with victims who are seen
and unseen. Victims tend to under-report their abuse, and despite the
legal system’s good intentions, victims who do report often do not re-
ceive the help they actually need.157 States that changed their child
abuse statutes to include fetus abuse opened up a new avenue through
which the child and the mother can seek protection. Redefining child
abuse to include fetus abuse could benefit women who introduce the
battered woman syndrome into evidence when they see no other
152. 53 A.L.R. 5th 499, supra note 70, at § 2.
153. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.011 (deciding that a child exposed to domestic violence
is grounds for terminating an abuser’s parental rights).
154. Id.
155. This is not an unreasonable fear. In Illinois, drug use and “habitual drinking” dur-
ing pregnancy is a basis “for waiving the requirement of maternal consent in an adoption
proceeding.” DWYER, supra note 22, at 650.
156. Id. at 641, 650.
157. Domestic Violence Facts, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet%28National%29.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2014); National Network to End Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Counts
2010: A 24-Hour Census of Domestic Violence Shelters and Services, http://nnedv.org
/resources/census/2010-report.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
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viable protection than violence. The risk of parental rights termina-
tion could motivate domestic abusers to attend rehabilitation pro-
grams. At the very least, attention to an abusive situation by an
additional agency such as Child Protective Services could provide
one more rung in a victim’s support system. Although critics of such
a definition change traditionally cite abortion rights concerns for why
this statutory phrasing is a bad idea, dangers exist outside the consti-
tutional abortion issue which cannot be balanced out by the positive
effects. The victim could be further victimized through neglect or
failure-to-protect prosecution. Disparate impact on pregnant women
in minority groups is a serious concern with fetal abuse claims, which
would only increase in severity when the protection toward the fetus
increased. And while the cooperation among agencies such as Child
Protective Services, the courts, and even hospitals could be benefi-
cial, our social services are stretched thinly already and one cannot
assume that an increase in their responsibilities would create an
effective solution. Until our society can redefine its interpretation
of a child’s best interests or our attitude toward domestic violence
as a systemic, not private, issue, this statutory redefinition will not
have the positive impact it could.
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